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CHAPTER 14 
Labor Relations 
LAWRENCE M. KEARNS 
A. FEDERAL-STATE JURISDICTION 
§14.1. "Piggyback" revisited. A footnote in the 1955 ANNUAL 
SURVEY! indicated that the so-called "piggyback" case,2 which had just 
then come down from the Supreme Court of the United States, would 
be further treated in the 1956 SURVEY. This was the case where the 
union had been enjoined by our Massachusetts courts from picketing 
the railroad to prevent the loading of truck trailers on railroad cars, 
an operation referred to as "piggybacking." The Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts had reasoned inter alia that since the Taft-
Hartley Act specifically defined the term "employer" as excluding 
railroads subject to the Railway Labor Act, a secondary boycott 
against the railroad would not be cognizable by the National Labor 
Relations Board; hence, the federal pre-emption rule would not de-
prive Massachusetts courts of equitable jurisdiction. 
The opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, reversing 
the Massachusetts decision, was principally devoted to the narrow 
point of interpreting the railroad exclusion in the Taft-Hartley Act. 
Its ruling was that the exclusion applied only where the railroad was 
involved in a labor dispute with its own employees and that a secondary 
boycott against the railroad was within the NLRB's jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, since "any person" may file a charge with the Board 
the railroad was in no way precluded from filing with the Board un-
fair labor practice charges as to the secondary boycott. 
In the course of its opinion the Supreme Court restates the general 
rule as to the area of exclusive federal jurisdiction in terms of whether 
the conduct involved is prohibited by Section 8 of the NLRA or pro-
tected by Section 7 of the act. While there are exceptions to this 
general rule as thus broadly stated, there is an inference from casting 
the issue in these terms that the states retain equitable jurisdiction to 
LAWRENCE M. KEARNS is a partner in the firm of Morgan, Brown and Kearns, 
Boston. He is co-author (with Donald A. Shaw) of Labor Relations Guide for 
Massachusetts (1950). 
The author wishes to acknowledge the research assistance of George E. Donovan 
and Robert M. La Prade, of the Board of Student Editors of the ANNUAL SURVEY. 
§14.1. ! 1955 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.3, note 4. 
2 Local 25, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. New York, New Haven & 
Hartford R. R., 350 U.S. 155, 76 Sup. Ct. 227, 100 L. Ed. 166 (1956). 
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enJOIn conduct unlawful under the laws of a state if it is neither 
specifically an unfair labor practice nor protected concerted aCtiVIty 
under the federal law. For example, a breach of a collective bargain-
ing agreement, such as a strike in violation of the no-strike clause or 
the refusal of a party to proceed with arbitration or to carry out an 
arbitration award under the grievance and arbitration provision of a 
contract, is not specifically an unfair labor practice under the National 
Labor Relations Act, as amended, but neither is such a contract 
breach protected concerted activity under Section 7 of that act. It 
would appear, therefore, that state courts have jurisdiction to enjoin 
wildcat strikes in violation of contract and to provide equitable 
remedies for compelling arbitration or enforcing labor arbitration 
awards if the applicable state law so permits. 
§14.2. Pre-emption doctrine: Further developments. The United 
States Supreme Court confirmed by decision in the so-called Kohler 
case l what it had stated by way of dictum in the Garner case,2 discussed 
in the 1954 SURVEy3 namely, that the states retain their traditional 
jurisdiction to enjoin violence, overt threats of violence (including 
threats of physical injury to employees and their families and the 
picketing of employees' homes), mass picketing and the like even 
though such conduct on the part of the union constitutes the unfair 
labor practice of coercion of employees under Section 8(b)(I) of the 
NLRA. The state action upheld was an order of the Wisconsin Em-
ployment Relations Board directed against the union and enforced by 
the Wisconsin courts rather than an injunction directly issued by a 
state court. But this point is immaterial. On the same day, the 
Supreme Court in a per curiam decision in Automobile Workers v. 
Anderson4 affirmed a judgment of the Minnesota Supreme Court5 
which had upheld the issuance of an injunction by the lower court in 
Minnesota under the Minnesota Labor Relations Act. That injunction 
enjoined the obstructing of highways and plant entrances, interfering 
with vehicles and their operators, mass picketing, assaults and threats 
of assaults, coercion, intimidation and other interferences with em-
ployees, all considered as "violence." 
Strangely enough, in the Cutter Laboratories case,6 also decided the 
same day, neither the majority nor minority opinions mentioned the 
pre-emption issue, although the point could well have been raised. 
There, the California Supreme Court had reversed the lower courts 
for sustaining an arbitration award which had ordered the reinstate-
ment of an employee discharged because of Communist Party member-
§14.2. 1 United Automobile Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board. 
351 U.S. 266. 76 Sup. Ct. 794. 100 L. Ed. 1162 (1956). 
2 Garner v. Teamsters Union. 346 U.S. 485. 74 Sup. Ct. 161.98 L. Ed. 288 (1953). 
31954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§16.l. 16.2. 
4351 U.S. 959. 76 Sup. Ct. 1024. 100 L. Ed. 1481 (1956). 
5 McQuay. Inc. v. United Automobile Workers. 245 Minn. 274. 72 N.W.2d 81. 36 
L.R.R.M. 2446 (1955). 
6 Black v. Cutter Laboratories. 351 U.S. 292. 76 Sup. Ct. 824. 100 L. Ed. 1188 
(1956). 
2
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1956 [1956], Art. 18
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1956/iss1/18
§14.2 LABOR RELATIONS 133 
ship. The majority based their dismissal of the writ of certiorari on 
the fact that no substantial federal question was involved because the 
California decision was "only California's construction of a local 
contract under local law," 7 namely, whether the term "just cause" for 
discharge in the labor contract encompassed membership in the Com-
munist Party and whether the doctrine of waiver applied. The dis-
senters thought the case raised important questions under the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments. It appears from the decision that the 
arbitration board had "determined that she [the employee] had been 
discharged for union activity ... " 8 This would constitute an unfair 
labor practice under Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. The Court did 
not mention this point and, accordingly, did not discuss the question 
whether the lower courts of California had any jurisdiction to confirm 
the award and enforce it by ordering reinstatement, apart from the 
Communist angle of the case. 
On the other hand the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
was this year specifically faced with the contention that arbitration of 
certain discharges should be enjoined because they involved a claim of 
discrimination for union activities exclusively within the NLRB's juris-
diction. The Court in Post Publishing Co. v. Cort 9 dismissed this 
contention on the narrow grounds that some issues in the arbitration 
case involved no question within NLRB jurisdiction and the arbitra-
tion board should at least be permitted to "sweep away grounds of 
dispute which are not within any preempted field." While remarking 
that the Supreme Court of the United States had not passed on the 
jurisdiction of an arbitrator to adjudicate a contract violation which 
is also an unfair labor practice (the Post case was decided May 14, 1956, 
and the Cutter Laboratories case June 4, 1956), the Massachusetts 
Court by way of dictum indicated it believes an arbitrator would have 
jurisdiction to proceed. 
On November 5, 1956, the Supreme Court in the Elle Construction 
case10 reversed a decision of the Idaho Supreme Court which had sus-
tained an injunction against picketing in violation of the Idaho 
Secondary Boycott Act. This reversal was without opinion; the Su-
preme Court merely cited its decision in Weber v. Anheuser-Busch.H 
The 1957 ANNUAL SURVEY should provide additional answers to 
questions in this area of federal-state jurisdiction in view of the rela-
tively large number of cases involving this issue in which the Supreme 
Court has granted certiorari. Included among these are several Sec-
tion 301 suits including General Electric Co. v. Local 205, United 
Electrical Workers12 and Goodall-Sanford, Inc. v. United Textile 
7351 U.S. at 299, 76 Sup. Ct. at 828, 100 L. Ed. at 1197. 
8351 U.S. at 295, 76 Sup. Ct. at 826, 100 L. Ed. at 1195. 
91956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 641, 647, 134 N.E.2d 431, 435. 
10 Pocatello Building and Construction Trades Council v. Elle Construction Co., 
352 U.S. 884, 77 Sup. Ct. 130, 1 L. Ed.2d 82 (1956). 
11 348 U.S. 468, 75 Sup. Ct. 480, 99 L. Ed. 546 (1955). 
12 233 F.2d 85, 38 L.R.R.M. 2019 (1st Cir. 1956), cert. granted, 352 U.S. 822, 77 
Sup. Ct. 63, 1 L. Ed.2d 46 (1956). 
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Workers, AFL.13 The District Court decisions in both litigations are 
referred to in the 1955 SURVEy.14 
B. MASSACHUSETTS DECISIONS 
§14.3. Labor arbitration. In Post Publishing Co. v. Cart,! the 
union submitted to arbitration the discharges of eighteen employees. 
The collective bargaining agreement provided that arbitration would 
be conducted pursuant to the voluntary arbitration rules of the Ameri-
can Arbitration Association. This association appointed an arbitrator 
and set a hearing date. The company brought a bill in equity to 
enjoin the holding of the hearing. The judge enjoined the hearing as 
to ten employees who admitted their discharge was solely for reasons 
of economy but claimed inter alia no consideration was given to their 
seniority. The judge found the agreement contained no provision as 
to seniority rights. There was no appeal from the judge's action in 
respect to these ten employees and the Supreme Judicial Court noted 
that no issue in respect to them was before the court. 
As to the other eight employees, the Supreme Court upheld the 
lower court in its refusal to enjoin the arbitration of their discharge. 
The Court noted that the agreement provided for arbitration of 
grievances or disputes "arising from the application of this agreement" 
and that complaints by employees "who allege discrimination or unjust 
treatment" are referred to as being subject to joint committee proce-
dure which is a part of the same paragraph as the arbitration provision. 
Without deciding whether the particular discharges were arbitrable 
the Court states that "The arbitrator should decide the jurisdictional 
question in the first instance" 2 and parties who raise the issue of 
jurisdiction before the arbitrator may proceed to a hearing on the 
13233 F.2d 104, 38 L.R.R.M. 2033 (1st Cir. 1956), cert. granted, 352 U.S. 822, 77 
Sup. Ct. 61, I L. Ed.2d 46 (1956). 
141955 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.2. The First Circuit held in these cases that 
the federal court had jurisdiction to compel arbitration under a collective bargain-
ing agreement by virtue of the U. S. Arbitration Act, but not under Section 301 
of the Taft-Hartley Act. In International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 25 v. W. 
L. Mead, Inc. (the District Court decision is referred to in §14.2 of the 1955 
SURVEY), the First Circuit sustained the District Court, affirming the Section 301 
jurisdiction of a suit for damages for a strike in violation of contract and also 
deciding. that a contract clause providing for arbitration by inference prohibits a 
strike on any matter arbitrable under the contract. 230 F.2d 576, 37 L.R.R.M. 2679. 
The petition for certiorari was dismissed pursuant to stipulation. 352 U.S. 802. It is 
interesting to note that on the point of whether the strike was a violation of an 
implied term of the collective bargaining agreement, Judge Magruder states, 
" ... there seems to be a complete dearth of indication in the Massachusetts de-
cisions as to what would be the Massachusetts law on the point; and we have 
no reason to suppose that the Massachusetts courts would reach any different con-
clusions ... " 230 F.2d 576, 584, 37 L.R.R.M. 2679, 2685. For a recent article on 
the subject of Section 301, see Mendelsohn, Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements 
Under Taft-Hartley Section 301, 66 Yale LJ. 167 (1956). 
§14.3. 11956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 641, 134 N.E.2d 431. 
21956 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 645, 134 N .E.2d at 434. 
'. 
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merits without waiving such issue; thus, "the right to a judicial deter-
mination will be preserved." 3 It has never been clear what procedure 
an employer might use to obtain such a judicial determination if 
the union does not choose to seek enforcement of the award in the 
courts but resorts to a strike and public pressure to obtain compliance. 
Possibly the Court is implying that there is equitable relief on the 
issue of an arbitrator's jurisdiction after the award is rendered or 
possibly an action for declaratory judgment might lie. In any event 
the Court stated that it saw "no irreparable injury in first, as promised, 
carrying out arbitration before the initial tribunal contemplated in 
the agreement." 4 
Another issue in this same case was the claim of federal pre-emption 
discussed under Section 14.2 above. 
The whole tenor of the Court's opinion is highly favorable toward 
the process of labor arbitration. Adoption of the rule that arbitra-
bility is an issue for the arbitrator in the first instance instead of a 
matter for judicial determination prior to arbitration is in accord with 
the views of most labor arbitrators and commentators.5 
The opinion does not go into the question whether G.L., c. 150, §ll, 
enacted in 1949, which cryptically states only that arbitration provisions 
in collective bargaining agreements shall be "valid," changes the 
common law rule that an agreement to arbitrate a future dispute may 
be revoked by either party at any time prior to the award. But it 
would appear of some significance that the Court did not see fit to 
make any comments which would give support to a contention that 
this statute had not changed the common law rule as to revocation. 
True, the Court stated, "We see no occasion to interrupt the normal 
course of the arbitration procedure voluntarily adopted by the parties 
themselves. In so deciding, we venture no statement as to the validity 
of any award." 6 This latter statement, in its context, appears to refer 
to the invalidity of an award which is not within the arbitrator's juris-
diction rather than one which is nugatory because the agreement to 
arbitrate was revoked. 
Interest in labor arbitration has not been confined this past SURVEY 
year to this decision. The CIO filed a bill in the legislature seeking to 
enact the Uniform Arbitration Act in Massachusetts.7 This bill was 
referred to a study by the Department of Labor and Industries.s Com-
missioner Ernest A. Johnson appointed an advisory committee repre-
sentative of labor, management and the public which has been study-
ing the problem with the Commissioner, and his report is due to be 
filed with the 1957 legislature. While a number of objections have 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Cox, Grievance Arbitration in the Federal Courts, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 591 (1954); 
Local 205, United Electrical Workers v. General Electric Co., 233 F.2d 85, 38 
L.R.R.M. 2019 (1st Cir. 1956). 
61956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 641, 645, 134 N.E.2d 431, 434. 
7 Senate No. 265 (1956). 
S Resolves of 1956, c. 90. 
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been voiced as to specific provisions of the Uniform Act, the general 
sentiment among management and labor appears to favor legislation 
to clarify the legal status of voluntary labor arbitration in our Com-
monwealth. 
§14.4. Unemployment compensation: Disqualification for bene-
fits because of labor dispute. Two cases of importance were handed 
down on the question of the right to unemployment benefits where 
there is a labor dispute. In Adomaitis v. Director of the Division of 
Employment Security,l during protracted collective bargaining negotia-
tions, the union gave notice of a strike deadline of April 20, but prior 
to this deadline the contract was extended to permit further negotia-
tions. Ultimately the extension expired on May 31 and a strike took 
place. The company was engaged in processing wool owned by its 
customers. As the strike deadline of April 20 approached, many 
customers stopped sending wool for processing and removed their un-
processed wool from the plant fearing that the wool could not be 
moved from the company's premises in the event of a prolonged 
strike. Consequently, although the company continued operation with 
staggered days off until the strike occurred on May 31, its operations 
were below normal. Employees filed claims for their partial unemploy-
ment during the period from April 20 to April 30 prior to the strike. 
General Laws, c. 151A, §25(b) denies benefits to an employee for "any 
week with respect to which the director finds that his unemployment 
is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute 
at the factory ... " The Court held that a labor dispute existed and 
that "stoppag@ of worK' tndndes a pal tiai stoppage -or--the blocking of 
" ... a subst<!Jl1i.al amount of work whj{;h .. _woulc;L otherwise be 
done. . .. " 2 In other words there need not be a complete stoppage 
of the employer's operation or a closed plant. Further, the Court 
adopted the "hut for" pd@ Qf camatjOI.l, AaAully~ Jb.at the lack of work 
wQJJld not have occurred but for the labor dispute. 
The decision is in accord with a recent decision of the New Jersey 
Supreme Court (written by Mr. Justice Brennan before his elevation 
to the Supreme Court of the United States).3 Decisions the other way 
in some other jurisdictions were based on different statutory language. 
The Court's decision appears to be sound, but the further refinements 
of the rationale may raise interesting problems. Presumably the result 
in Adomaitis would have been the same had no strike occurred, be-
cause the loss of business prior to the strike was due. to the strike 
threat rather than to the ~ itself. Still other questions may exist 
where no strike threat is given but the union policy is one of "no 
contract - no work" or where an impasse is reached and the dispute 
is in conciliation but no strike vote has been taken. Application of 
the rule may be difficult where a lay-off may be due in part to economic 
§14.4. 11956 Mass. Adv. She 1043, 136 N.E.2d 259. 
21956 Mass. Adv. She at 1046, 136 N.E.2d at 261. 
3 Mortensen v. Board of Review, Division of Employment Security, 21 N.J. 242, 
121A.2d 539, 37 L.R.R.M. 95 (1956). 
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conditions in the industry generally and in part to loss of business 
resulting from customers' reactions to the strike threat. 
The second unemployment case involving a labor dispute was 
Howard Brothe,rs Manufacturing Co. v. Director of the Division of 
Employment Security.4 Here the employees struck in violation of a 
collective bargaining agreement. The company notified the employees 
that they were removed from the payroll and no longer considered 
employees. The Division of Employment Security and the Superior 
Court held they were entitled to unemployment benefits beginning on 
a date two weeks after the strike, on the theory that the labor dispute 
had then ended because the strikers had been replaced on their jobs 
by other employees. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed and ordered 
the director to enter an order denying all benefits to the claimants 
unless, since they left work with the company, they should later 
qualify by four weeks of covered employment as provided by G.L., c. 
151A, §25(e). 
The result is a sound one although the reasoning is somewhat un-
expected. The Court held that the employees left their jobs volun-
tarily without good cause attributable to the employer.5 A strike is 
a labor dispute and the statutory disqualification for unemployment 
due to a labor dispute does not distinguish between lawful and un-
lawful labor disputes. But it would not seem to follow necessarily that 
no disqualification is any longer applicable to unemployment existing 
after the employees have been replaced. Replacement of the strikers 
operates as a discharge. In the case of strikers who strike in violation 
of their collective bargaining agreement, it could reasonably be con-
cluded that such a serious offense constituted "deliberate misconduct 
in willful disregard of the employing unit's interest" 6 (which results 
in the same disqualification as for voluntarily leaving one's work) and 
that this offense was the reason for their being discharged by replace-
ment. 
Having in mind that a strike in violation of contract is unprotected 
concerted activity under federal and state labor relations acts, this 
reasoning would not result in the same disqualification for economic 
strikers after the labor dispute had ended by replacement of the 
strikers. In such a case the concerted activity protected by law would 
not be held "deliberate misconduct." 
The difficulty with the Court's reasoning is that it could apply 
to any strike, for in all strikes employees have left their work. But if 
this were to follow, the Division would presumably have to determine 
whether the employees struck "without good cause" attributable to 
the employer. This could involve the Division in the Solomon-like 
task of determining the justice or injustice of the strike, a task in-
appropriate for it to handle. Furthermore, in the field of labor rela-
tions a strike, whether protected or unprotected concerted activity, is 
4333 Mass. 244. 130 N.E.2d 108 (1955). 
II C.L .• c. 151A. §25(e)(1). 
6 Id. §25 (e)(2). 
7
Kearns: Chapter 14: Labor Relations
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1956
138 1956 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETIS LAW §14.5 
not ordinarily equated with voluntary quitting or absenteeism, which 
are the usual personnel actions considered within the "voluntary leav-
ing" disqualification. 
A question left unanswered by the Court's approach is whether the 
Division would be expected to apply both the labor disputes and 
"voluntary leaving" disqualifications. In the absence of clarification 
one would suppose that the Division would continue its past policies 
as to handling labor dispute disqualifications except for strikes in 
violation of contract which would now be under the "voluntary 
leaving" disqualification. 
Curiously enough the Court disregards the company's notices to the 
employees as "immaterial." An employer may legally discharge em-
ployees who strike in violation of contract. The notices here seem 
to have been intended for such purpose. It would have been appro-
priate to give effect to the notices and hold that the strike in violation 
of contract was deliberate misconduct thus coming within the dis-
charge disqualification. 
One can readily agree with the Court that "It is not the purpose of 
the law to provide strike benefits for persons who have voluntarily left 
their job in violation of contract ... " 7 And certainly such a situation 
warrants the imposition of the severest disqualification permitted by 
the statute. The reasoning in reaching the correct result may, how-
ever, be of importance under other circumstances. 
§14.5. Employment security: Separation pay. The Supreme 
Judicial Court upheld the opinion of the Division of Employment 
Security interpreting the statutory definition of remuneration in respect 
to separation pay in Kalen v. Director of the Division of Employ-
ment Security.1 An employee upon discharge received (1) two 
weeks' pay in lieu of dismissal notice, (2) $249 as a "vacation allow-
ance," and (3) $1452.50 as severance pay. All three types of payments 
were held to be remuneration2 allocable to the weeks following his 
discharge, the number of such weeks being determined by dividing 
such remuneration by his average weekly wage. The employee was 
then held not eligible for benefits during that number of weeks after 
his discharge. 
c. MASSACHUSETTS LEGISLATION 
§14.6. Increased benefits. While legislative enactments in 1956 
in the field of labor relations were important from an economic and 
social point of view, they were for the most part relatively unimportant 
so far as the development of labor law is concerned. Benefits under 
7333 Mass. 244, 248, 130 N.E.2d 108, llO (1955). 
§14.5. 11956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1021, 136 N.E.2d 257. 
2 For further treatment of "remuneration," see the discussion in 1955 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §14.4. 
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the Employment Security Law1 and the Workman's Compensation Act2 
were increased and the state minimum wage was increased.3 The 
general practitioner would be interested in the increase from $30 to 
$40 in the amount of wages and premiums exempt from attachment.4 
§14.7. Miscellaneous statutes. One of the important changes 
in the Employment Security Law revised the definition of "base 
period" (within which an employee must earn $500 to be eligible for 
benefits and the highest wage quarter of which determines the amount 
of benefits) from the first four of the last five completed quarters 
prior to filing a claim, to the fifty-two-week period prior to filing.! 
Under an amendment to the minimum wage law, wage boards are 
now specifically authorized to include in minimum wage orders an 
overtime rate for work over forty hours per week.2 This represented 
a legislative compromise in connection with a labor-sponsored measure 
which would have required time and a half for overtime after forty 
hours per week for intrastate employment generally. Although the 
federal Wage and Hour Law which provides for such overtime has 
been on the books since 1938, no state has yet passed a similar law 
applying generally to intrastate business. 
Other legislation included a prohibition against hiring a child 
during a labor dispute without the written consent of his parent or 
guardian,3 and a requirement of registered mail notice of a labor 
dispute to an employment agency, if the employer involved in the 
dispute wishes to hire through the agency.4 The maximum age for 
which educational certificates are required of employees who are minors 
was reduced to eighteen.5 The law protecting the re-employment and 
seniority rights of employees on military leave was broadened to in-
clude leave for training in an organized unit of the ready reserve of 
the armed forces.6 A new statute clarifies the laws requiring weekly 
payment of wages,7 and an amendment 8 to the State Labor Relations 
Act provides that it will not be unlawful for an employer to pay 
regular initiation fees, dues, and assessments to a union of which he 
is a member or eligible for membership. This latter particularly 
affects such individuals as barbers and skilled craftsmen who are em-
ployers and whose dues payments to unions heretofore were prohibited 
by Section 4 of the State Labor Relations Act. 
§14.6. 1 Acts of 1956, c. 719. 
2 Id., c. 735. 
3 Id., c. 740. 
4 Id., c. 155. 
§14.7. 1 Acts of 1956, c. 719. 
2 Id., c. 681. 
3 Acts of 1956, c. 471. 
4 Ibid. 
I; Acts of 1956, c. 234. 
6 Id., c. 385. 
7 Id., c. 259. 
8 Id., c. 286. 
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